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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ms. Skogen pushed C.J., a child who she was babysitting, in a moment of 
overwhelming frustration. C.J. hit his head as he fell, suffering severe cranial injuries, 
to which he later succumbed. Ms. Skogen initially failed to disclose her culpability as to 
C.J.'s injuries, but admitted her role less than one day later. The district court 
improperly relied on only general deterrence and retribution to justify imposing a prison 
sentence of thirteen years, with four years fixed, on Ms. Skogen following her plea of 
guilty to voluntary manslaughter. 
The concept of general deterrence is fundamentally flawed, and so it should be 
disregarded and not used as the sole basis to justify a punitive prison sentence, as 
doing so undermines the protection the sentence affords society. By relying solely on 
general deterrence in this case, the district court has, therefore, abused its discretion. 
Regardless, even if the concept of general deterrence is still a valid basis upon 
which a prison sentence may be imposed, Ms. Skogen's sentence erodes, not furthers, 
that objective. Deterrence is established if the target of the deterrent effect is able to 
predict several aspects of a foreseeable punishment with certainty. Ms. Skogen's 
sentence destroys the certainty of the severity of punishment and certainty of a prison 
term for similar crimes, and thus, undermines the objective of general deterrence. In 
addition, the district court failed to consider relevant information from past similar cases, 
which demonstrates this flaw with the sentence. This, too, is an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
Furthermore, the district court insufficiently considered several mitigating factors 
and misconstrued some as aggravating factors. Additionally, it did not appropriately 
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consider the statutory factors regarding the decision to impose a prison sentence rather 
than suspend it. Moreover, it refused to consider information on sentences imposed in 
similar cases, despite the fact that the information was relevant to multiple aspects of 
this case. These insufficient considerations also constitute abuses of the district court's 
discretion. 
Finally, the district court usurped the Legislature's authority by attempting to 
create a new section for specific, harsher punishment for baby sitters or care givers 
entrusted to care for another person's child. No such language exists in the statute and 
various courts across the state have not imposed such a requirement, not even for the 
parents of child victims. This infringement on the separation of powers is yet another 
abuse of the court's discretion. 
As a result of all these abuses of its discretion, the district court imposed an 
excessive sentence. This Court should remedy these abuses by reducing Ms. Skogen's 
sentence appropriately. Alternatively, it should remand this case for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On October 4, 2010, Ms. Skogen made a terrible decision. Suffering stress and 
anxiety resulting from her hectic day and her family's stretched financial situation, she 
shoved the child for whom she was caring when he became uncooperative as she tried 
to change him. (Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), pp.3-4.) The child, C.J., fell 
and hit his head hard enough to cause major injuries. (PSI, p.4 and Police Report (PR), 
attached to the PSI with hand numbered pages, p.20.) C.J. later succumbed to those 
injuries. (PSI, p.2.) 
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Initially, Ms. Skogen was not fully truthful with emergency responders, including 
police officers. (See, e.g., 3/11/11 Tr., p.260, Ls. 1-20.) She failed to tell them that she 
had pushed C.J. (3/11/11 Tr., p.260, Ls.1-20.) Doctors, however, were aware that C.J. 
had suffered a serious head injury upon his arrival at the hospital. (PR, p.20.) Officer 
Hunt initially interviewed Ms. Skogen during his investigation into possible child abuse. 
(PR, pp.20-26.) During that interview, he inquired about the possibility that C.J. had 
been abused by his parents, but Ms. Skogen told the officer that she did not believe 
C.J.'s parents would have abused him. (PR, p.25.) Ms. Skogen and C.J.'s parents 
were asked to take polygraph examinations regarding the incident. (PSI, p.2.) C.J.'s 
parents' were truthful, but Ms. Skogen's was not. (PSI, p.2.) When confronted with 
that evidence of her deception during an interview with Officer Beck on October 5, 
2010, Ms. Skogen admitted her culpability in the matter. (See generally 10/5/10 
Tr., pp.48-69.) Since admitting her role in the incident some twenty-two hours after it 
occurred, 1 Ms. Skogen has not materially changed her story. (10/5/10 Tr., p.68, 
L.11 - p.69, L.13; PSI, p.4.)2 
Initially, Ms. Skogen was only bound over to the district court on a charge of 
involuntary manslaughter. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.298, Ls.20-25; p.299, Ls.14-15.)3 
However, as part of a non-binding plea bargain, she agreed to plead guilty to voluntary 
1 Officer Hunt responded to the incident at approximately 6: 10 p.m. on October 4, 2010. 
(PR, p.20.) Officer Beck noted toward the end of his interview with Ms. Skogen on 
October 5, 2010, that "I've got 4:30 right now." (10/5/10 Tr., p.74, L.3.) There is no 
indication of whether the interview occurred in the morning or afternoon. (See generally 
10/5/10 Tr.) Assuming Officer Beck meant 4:30 p.m., that interview occurred 
approximately twenty-two hours after Officer Hunt initially responded to the hospital. 
2 The PSI was conducted on March 4, 2011. (PSI, p.1) 
3 There is a discrepancy between the record and the transcript as to the date the 
preliminary hearing occurred. (Compare Preliminary Hearing Tr., cover page, with 
R., p.236.) Therefore, it will not be identified by the date of the hearing, as are the other 
transcript citations. 
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manslaughter. (See, e.g., 12/14/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.22-24.) At sentencing, some eighteen 
family members and friends testified to demonstrate their support for Ms. Skogen. (See 
generally 3/11/11 Tr., pp.92-189, 226-235.) Two expressed their continuing desire that 
Ms. Skogen should care for their children, should they become unable to do so. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.137, Ls.4-18, p.153, Ls.10-14.) A third testified that he has allowed 
Ms. Skogen to watch his daughter on two occasions since the incident. (3/11/11 
Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.4.) 
In addition, psychologist Dr. Daniel S. Hayes testified, explaining the reasons 
Ms. Skogen was unable to be truthful during the initial hours following the incident. He 
explained that she, like many others people in similar situations, had to reconcile her 
actions with her perception of her character. (3/11/11 Tr., p.207, Ls.4-14.) He informed 
the court that, because of her perceptions as a "fixer" and care provider, reconciling this 
particular action and the horror that resulted with her character would be "very difficult." 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.201, Ls.2-6.) He also explained that this period of reconciliation is often 
accompanied by a period of non-disclosure, as the person is yet unable to articulate 
what exactly has happened. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.208, Ls.10-13.) Finally, he explained 
that once the reconciliation is achieved, a period of revelation follows, which is usually 
accompanied by grief and embarrassment. (3/11/11 Tr., p.208, Ls.16-17.) Officer 
Beck, who witnessed Ms. Skogen's moment of reconciliation and initial revelation, 
explained to Ms. Skogen's husband that, "[t]his is pretty typical that people hold in a 
thing like this and there's a lot of fear and there's a lot of embarrassment. And I think 
especially when it comes to a child like this it's fear and embarrassment." (10/5/1 O 
Tr., p.73, Ls.1-5.) Dr. Hayes concluded that "[t]he sequence of Ms. Skogen's reactions 
and behaviors after the incident in question and its painful outcome, is common and can 
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be attributed to a desire to take the moment back and make it right." (Dr. Hayes's 
Psychological Report (Hayes Report), p.8.) 
As it imposed sentence, the district court made several interesting findings. First, 
it found that there was no need to protect society against Ms. Skogen, nor was there a 
need to provide her with specific deterrence. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-7, 13-15 
("Considering protection of society first, I don't believe that MS. Skogen would commit 
such an act again ... Deterrence is a factor. Again, I don't think it's a situation of 
specific deterrence to Ms. Skogen.").) Second, it found that the only rehabilitation that 
Ms. Skogen needed, like many of the people affected by this case, was counseling. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.8-12.) Third, it found the fact that Ms. Skogen was C.J.'s baby 
sitter and was thereby in a position of trust to be an aggravating factor. (3/11/11 
Tr., p.259, Ls.19-22 ("There's certainly an aggravating factor here in that, Ms. Skogen, 
you were a baby-sitter of young [C.J.]. You were in a position of trust and you abused 
that trust.").) Fourth, it implied that her initial non-disclosure delayed effective medical 
treatment. (3/11 /11 Tr., p.260, Ls.1-7 ("Instead of telling the emergency personnel and 
doctors what happened, you lied and you continued to lie for a period .... and there 
was a delay, at least in the medical personnel, in knowing exactly what happened to 
cause the injuries.").) Fifth, it found that her initial non-disclosure was the reason C.J.'s 
parents were subjected to scrutiny by the officers investigating the potential child abuse 
case, which, in its opinion, was also an aggravating factor. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.260, 
Ls.8-17 ("The effect on [C.J.'s] parents was substantial because -- because you did not 
come forward, there was naturally some focus upon them as being possible causes of 
his injuries and death. This certainly put them in a position where they were being 
scrutinized at a time when their interests should have been focused solely upon [C.J.], 
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and that was strictly a result of your deception.").) Finally, it refused to consider the 
evidence of the results from numerous similar cases presented by defense counsel. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.257, Ls.6-11.) 
As a result, it imposed a sentence for two main reasons: general deterrence 
(and similarly, a desire to not depreciate the seriousness of the crime) and retribution. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.261, L.15 - p.262, L.9.) 
That really comes down to another factor, which is punishment. ... Here, 
Ms. Skogen, you are responsible for the death of a 3-1/2 year old child. 
Your actions have robbed his parents and relatives of his love and 
affection, and your actions have robbed them of watching him grow up, 
watching the -- experiencing the joys and tribulations that go into raising 
children. 
(3/11/11 Tr., p.261, L.19 - p.262, L.3.) Thus, it imposed a thirteen-year sentence, 
with four years fixed. (R., pp.476-480.) Ms. Skogen timely appealed from that order. 
(R., p.487.) Subsequently, she filed a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 
Rule 35 (Rule 35). (R., p.496.) That motion was denied.4 (7/12/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.2-9.) 
4 Because trial counsel did not present any new information at the Rule 35 hearing, the 
order denying the Rule 35 motion is not challenged on appeal. State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence 
based on general deterrence and punishment alone. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of thirteen years, with four years fixed, upon Ms. Skogen following her 
plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter. 
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ARGUMENT 
Both issues that Ms. Skogen presents on appeal are generally categorized as 
assertions that the imposed sentence is excessive. Where a defendant contends that 
the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. 
See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part 
of the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Skogen does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, she must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or objectives, of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the court should 
consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Ergo, a sentence that 
protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered 
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohilf, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because 
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and therefore, 
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 
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(2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status 
as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, 
and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis 
for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 
482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); 
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 
Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, 
several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the court as it 
crafted Mr. Skogen's sentence, and, as a result, the sentence does not serve the 
recognized objectives of criminal punishment, and is excessive. 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing A Prison Sentence Based On 
General Deterrence And Punishment Alone 
A. Introduction 
Although the notion that general deterrence alone can justify a prison sentence 
has been accepted by Idaho courts, new research reveals that not only is the theory of 
general deterrence fundamentally flawed, but that basing a punitive prison sentence on 
it alone actually increases the risk to society in the future. Therefore, Idaho Courts 
should abandon the rule allowing for such sentences. 
Furthermore, the sentence imposed in this case does not serve the objective of 
general deterrence, and so if this Court decides to continue to use the flawed objective 
of general deterrence alone, it still needs to modify Ms. Skogen's sentence. 
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B. The Concept Of General Deterrence Is Fundamentally Flawed And Should Be 
Abandoned By Idaho Courts 
Deterrence is only possible if the prospective offender perceives a risk of 
punishment. Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 
Criminology, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2005, at 623, 625. The current approach to deterrence 
presupposes that a link exists between actual punishment and the perception of future 
punishment for a hypothetical future act. Id. at 624. It assumes that the prospective 
offender is able to foresee both the fact that his act will be deemed wrongful as well as 
the effects his act will have. Idaho courts have followed this logical fallacy when they 
have permitted general deterrence alone to justify a prison sentence. See, e.g., 
State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 76 (1978); see also State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 97 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
This presumption is tenuous at best when applied to specific deterrence, but 
becomes even more problematic when it is stretched from the punishment of a specific 
defendant to the perceptions of potential punishment by society at large. Kleck et al., at 
624. Simply put, the perception does not exist in terms of a general deterrence theory. 
See id. In order for general deterrence to be effective, the targets of that effect must be 
able to predict the certainty, severity, and swiftness of the punishment for the act they 
are considering. Id. at 647. In order to adequately predict those aspects, several 
factors must be predictably certain. Id. at 633-35. They are the certainty of arrest, the 
certainty of conviction, the certainty of imprisonment, certainty of duration of sentence, 
and certainty of swift punishment. Id. 
There are several reasons why the average non-criminal citizen (the primary 
target of general deterrence) will not be able to adequately predict those factors and, 
therefore, will not be deterred by other sentences. First, there is poor coverage of such 
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events by the news media. Id. at 630. While there are some massive, in-depth reports 
on some criminal events, the mundane, day-to-day sentencings are not often reported, 
and even more rarely followed. Id. Even the major events fade from the public memory 
with time and the next big story. Furthermore, the reports that do emerge provide 
inaccurate perspectives of these critical factors due to reporter bias and editorial 
decision-making. See id. 
Second, the non-criminal citizen often has little to no personal experience with 
the criminal justice system and, thus, has no base of knowledge with which to compare 
new information about sentencings. Id. at 631. As that is the case, they are unable to 
accurately predict these factors even when they do hear about a case because they do 
not have a sufficient knowledge base with which to analyze the new information. 
Third, and particularly focused on smaller and more rural counties (i.e., most of 
Idaho), there is simply not enough information generated, particularly in terms of felony 
cases, to provide a stable, sufficient pool of data from which appropriate and reasonable 
conclusions regarding deterrence can be drawn. See id., at 633. Since there is not 
enough data for trained statisticians to draw reliable conclusions from, there cannot be 
sufficient evidence for the average member of society to draw reliable conclusions from. 
Thus, particularly in smaller, more rural counties, the notion of general deterrence is 
implausible. 
Furthermore, Idaho's discretionary sentencing structure, which does not employ 
a guidelines approach but instead gives broad discretion to the sentencing court, 
provides for an even more unpredictable sentence because comparisons to known 
cases provides little, if any, actual guidance for the risk of the potential punishment. 
Thus, even the minimal data available is not overly useful when it comes to predicting 
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future sentences in similar cases. Therefore, specifically due to Idaho's approach to 
sentencing, it is almost impossible to predict with any certainty the factors which would 
create a general deterrent effect. 
Even where there is sufficient data to generate reliable results, studies reveal 
that the public is unable to accurately predict most of the factors. Id., at 647. The only 
factor which was accurately predicted was the certainty of the length of the sentence. 
Id. The pro-deterrence impact of that prediction, however, is contradicted by the 
inability to accurately predict when such punishments will come into play, and so even 
those potentially-positive results do not have a significant positive effect on the potential 
for general deterrence. Id. at 647-48. These results mean that, beyond the basic 
general deterrence that is generated by the existence of the nebulous concept that 
punishment will be handed down for wrongful acts, there is no correlation between the 
level of punishment and the level of deterrence. Id. at 653-54. "Thus, increased 
punishment levels are not likely to increase deterrent effects, and decreased 
punishment levels are not likely to decrease deterrent effects." Id. Therefore, because 
this concept is based on a faulty presumption, Idaho courts should abandon it, and 
Adams, Urquhart, and the like should be overruled insofar as they permit incarceration 
on the flawed concept of general deterrence alone. 
Ms. Skogen's case provides several illustrations of this flaw in action. First, 
for her sentence to have any generally deterring effect, any care giver for a child 
(i.e., parents, legal guardians, and temporary care givers) would have to be able to 
foresee both that their actions will be deemed wrongful and that they will cause severe 
injury or death to the child, and so, based on the punishment imposed on Ms. Skogen, 
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refrain from engaging in that particular action.5 Suppose then, a babysitter engages in a 
physical activity with a child which risks a life-threatening injury to the child similar to 
the one suffered by C.J. For Ms. Skogen's sentence to have a deterrent effect on that 
babysitter, she would have to foresee that her physical activity will later be deemed 
wrongful (i.e., classified as negligent horse play), and that the child will be injured, and 
that the injury will be life-threatening. Otherwise, they will be unable to perceive the risk 
of a punishment similar to Ms. Skogen's for those actions. As it is unlikely she will be 
able to foresee all three necessary components, (which is what the concept of general 
deterrence would presume), she will still act, and the child will be injured, regardless of 
what sentence Ms. Skogen received. 
As pointed out in note 5, supra, there is also the presupposition that all 
care givers will be aware of this case. That, however, is empirically disproved, as 
demonstrated by defense counsel's presentation of similar cases just from Kootenai 
County. Sadly, Kootenai County courts have addressed cases involving the death of 
a child due to the actions of a care giver at least three times in the past eleven years. 6 
State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004) (Kootenai County Case No. CR-00-7677); 
State v. Nakaji, Kootenai County Case No. CR-02-16548; State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49 
5 This also presupposes that all parents, legal guardians, and temporary care-providers 
(including teenage babysitters) are actually aware of the facts of this case and the 
sentence imposed. Such a presupposition is also facially faulty. 
6 Defense counsel attached various Kootenai County cases with similarities to the facts 
of this case. (See R., p.459 (this is the notice of filing that accompanied the packet).) 
The packet was included as an exhibit to the record on appeal. It is not paginated and 
so the cases are referenced by their Kootenai County case numbers, which begin with 
the criminal case designation of "CR." All of this information was dismissed out of hand 
by the district court. (3/11/11 Tr., p.251, Ls.10-22 and p.257, Ls.6-11.) While all are 
relevant to this argument (hence making the court's non-consideration of them an abuse 
of discretion), Tiffany, Nakaji, and Whittle are the most similar to this case, and so are 
the only ones which will be discussed in detail. Tiffany and Whittle each have 
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(2007) (Kootenai County Case No. CR-03-4515). All three cases resulted in a 
conviction and a sentence, yet none deterred Ms. Skogen, although the flawed 
presupposition would hold that they should have. It also presumes that she was aware 
that all three cases had occurred and what sentences each defendant had received. 
Yet, despite all these cases and the punishments meted out therein, Ms. Skogen still 
acted as she did. Thus, the presupposition that she was aware of them and so acted in 
accordance with those sentences is empirically disproved. And while it is possible that 
Ms. Skogen could have perceived her action would be later deemed wrongful, it is 
doubtful that she would have been able to foresee that her actions would cause injuries 
to C.J., and certainly not that those injuries would be life-threatening.7 Therefore, it 
would have been unlikely in the extreme that Ms. Skogen perceived a risk of 
punishment for her action, and so the punishments meted out in Tiffany, Nakaji, and 
Whittle, assuming Ms. Skogen was even aware of those cases, had no general 
deterrent effect. 
Furthermore, Ms. Skogen was convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-4006(1 ). (R., p.477.) The statute defines this crime as "the unlawful killing of 
a human being ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." I.C. § 18-4006(1 ). "Heat 
of passion" is a term of art which has been defined as "[r]age, terror, or furious hatred 
suddenly aroused by some immediate provocation, usu. [sic] another person's words or 
actions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 327 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). As indicated by both 
accompanying decisions on appeal which supplement the information provided in the 
racket of cases. Nakajiwas appealed, but the court affirmed without discussion. 
According to forensic pathologist Dr. John Howard, who testified at the preliminary 
hearing in this case, the injury to C.J.'s abdomen, while serious, provoked a 
physiological response similar to any other injury, and that it alone was not 
life-threatening. (R., p.450, Ls.6-14.) 
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terms in the statutory definition, voluntary manslaughter occurs when a person kills 
another person due to a sudden and overpowering emotional release. 
Deterrence requires that the actor be able to foresee the risk of punishment and 
be able to refrain from acting in light of that foreseeable risk. Kleck et al., at 625. A 
person acting under the influence of sudden and overpowering emotions is not capable 
of foresight at that moment, which is the reason they cannot be convicted of 
murder (i.e., the killing of a human being with malice aforethought (I.C. § 18-4001 ).) 
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 327. As foresight is not possible in the moment of action, 
the actor cannot foresee the risk of punishment, and so, regardless of the sentence 
imposed in this case, they will not be deterred, even if they would be while they were in 
a rational state of mind. Instead, they will act in accordance with the sudden and 
overpowering emotions. Ms. Skogen is considered to be a good and rational person by 
her friends and family. (See generally 3/11/11 Tr., pp.92-189, 226-235.) Yet she, in a 
moment of irrational anger, acted without reason. Therefore, even if she had been 
aware of the prior cases, they would not have deterred her action because she was 
acting without foresight and in the heat of passion. Therefore, particularly in cases of 
voluntary manslaughter, general deterrence is a flawed concept. 
It is clear from this case alone that the concept of general deterrence is fatally 
flawed. Therefore, justifying a unified sentence of thirteen years, four of which are fixed, 
based solely on that concept is improper and constitutes an abuse of discretion.8 
8 Although punishment was also a reason for the prison sentence, a sentence cannot be 
purely vindictive (i.e., driven by a vengeful or punitive desire). See, e.g., State v. Brown, 
131 Idaho 61, 72 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Register, 106 Idaho 296,302 (Ct. App. 
1984)). Therefore, if general deterrence (the only other justification) fails, the sentence 
would be solely based on a punitive desire, and thus be inappropriately vindictive. 
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C. This Sentence, Imposed Only For General Deterrence And Retributive Purposes, 
Actually Undermines The Protection It Affords Society, And As Such, Constitutes 
An Abuse Of Discretion 
In addition to being based on a faulty premise, the sentence in this case also 
undermines the protection afforded society by incarcerating a person for whom 
incarceration is not needed. This is due to the criminological effects suffered by a 
person during their period of incarceration, particularly when no preventative or 
rehabilitative effects will be promoted by the incarceration. 
There are two prospective impacts caused by the prison system: preventative 
effects (i.e., specific deterrence and rehabilitation) and criminological effects 
(i.e., reinforcing criminal tendencies). Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and 
Reoffending, Crime and Justice, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2009, at 115, 167. Therefore, to 
determine if a sentence will be overly harmful, the court needs to determine whether the 
preventative effects resulting from the purpose for incarceration are still significant 
in light of the damage posed by the criminological effects of incarceration. In this 
case, the court determined that there was no need to provide specific deterrence to 
Ms.Skogen. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.13-15.) Furthermore, in terms of rehabilitation, it 
only found that Ms. Skogen would be in need of some counseling, as were many other 
people affected by this case, as a result of these events. However, it stopped short of 
finding she needed it to reduce the risk she posed to society, as the court found that 
risk to be minimal in this case. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-12.) Therefore, the impact of 
the preventative effects (i.e., specific deterrence and rehabilitation) will likely be minimal 
in Ms. Skogen's case. The impact of the criminological effects, on the other hand, will 
be significant. 
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Criminological effects emerge from two related consequences of incarceration: 
public stigmatization and social learning theory. Id. at 126-27. First, the public 
stigmatizes and shuns people who have been labeled as "criminals," making it more 
difficult for those people to be accepted by, and thus reintegrate into, society following 
their incarceration. Id. at 126. Second, based on the social learning theory, a person 
will develop or reinforce character traits valued by the society they are in so that they 
will be accepted by that society. See id. In prison, the society is made of criminals, and 
therefore, the valued traits are criminal in nature. See id. In addition, developing or 
reinforcing criminal traits undermines previously-developed ties with mainstream 
society, even those with family. Id. at 126-27. Thus, upon release, the criminal must 
re-learn and re-emphasize the character traits valued by general society in order to be 
acceptable to general society. See id. They must do this, however, in the face of the 
not insignificant public stigmatization. Id. As a result, they are less likely to be able to 
re-forge these connections to society (as they are learned by interaction with other 
members of the society and it is difficult for a person to interact with someone who is 
shunning them), and so they are left with only the criminal traits learned and reinforced 
by the prison system. See id. And since they are likely to act in accordance with these 
now-dominant criminological traits, the risk that they will reoffend is also proportionally 
increased. See id. And since Ms. Skogen currently has no risk to reoffend, (see 
3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-7, 13-15), the sentence creates a new risk for reoffending, 
andthus, creates a new risk for society. Evidence collected in various studies confirms 
this theory: that prisons are more criminological than preventative.9 Id. at 145-155. 
9 The two studies that found significant preventative effects do not explore the same 
question as the other studies. Nagin et al. at 184-85. Instead of examining the effect of 
custodial and non-custodial sanctions on the likelihood for reoffending, those two 
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These criminological effects are particularly likely to affect low-risk inmates. See 
id. at 127-28. The reason for this is that effective treatment is a necessary part of 
successful interventions (which includes incarceration). Id. at 127. However, prison 
treatment is aimed at helping high-risk offenders because not only is there more need 
for treatment in those offenders, but the rewards of success are greater there as well. 
Id. at 127-28. Therefore, low-risk offenders do not get effective treatment, and thus, 
receive an ineffective intervention, which increases their risk of recidivism. Id. at 128 
(citing Paula Smith, "The Effects of Incarceration on Recidivism: A Longitudinal 
Examination of Program Participation and Institutional Adjustment in Federally 
Sentenced Adult Male Offenders," Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 
Department of Psychology, 2006). 
Ms. Skogen is a low-risk offender. She has no other criminal history. (PSI, p.4.) 
Additionally, the court found that, in terms of the need to protect society and to provide 
specific deterrence, "I don't believe that Ms. Skogen would commit such an act again. 
There's no way to say with all certainty, but I think Dr. Hayes's testimony that repeat of 
this action by her would be remote is the likely case." (See, e.g., 3/11/11 Tr., p.261, 
Ls.3-7 and 13-15.) Ergo, incarcerating Ms. Skogen subjects her to the criminological 
effects, increasing her recidivism risk. When accompanied by the fact that she will 
receive minimal preventative benefits from incarceration, this ultimately decreases the 
protection afforded society by this sentence. She poses no risk right now, but at the 
end of her sentence, there will be an increased risk. Thus, the sentence fails to properly 
address the most critical of the sentencing objectives. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 
studies merely asked if there were any preventative effects generated by incarceration. 
Id. Because of their narrow focus, their results do not carry significant weight in the 
analysis of the criminological versus preventative question. See id. 
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500. Failing to sufficiently consider the sentencing objectives (particularly the protection 
of society) constitutes an abuse of discretion and is grounds for relief. See, e.g., 
Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294. 
D. Even If General Deterrence Is Still An Acceptable Objective In Sentencing, 
Ms. Skogen's Sentence Is Still Excessive As It Fails To Promote That Objective 
As noted previously, deterrence is only possible where the prospective offender 
is able to perceive the risk of punishment. Kleck et al., at 625. In order to perceive that 
risk, they must be able to accurately predict the certainty, severity, and swiftness of 
punishment, by anticipating the certainty of arrest, conviction, imprisonment, length of 
sentence, and swiftness of punishment. Id., at 633-35, 647. Ms. Skogen's sentence 
destroys the certainty of imprisonment and, thus, severity of punishment. Illustrating 
this, before her sentence was imposed, several of the most similar and recent cases in 
Kootenai County - dealing with a situation where a care giver was convicted of a crime 
which resulted in the death of a child - resulted in a suspended sentence or a period 
of retained jurisdiction followed by a suspended sentence. 10 See, e.g., Tiffany, 
CR-00-7677 (suspended sentence appropriate for involuntary manslaughter of a child); 
Nakaji, CR-02-16548 (period of retained jurisdiction resulting in probation is appropriate 
for voluntary manslaughter of a child); Whittle, CR-03-4515 (period of retained 
jurisdiction resulting in probation is appropriate for injury to children resulting in the 
child's death. The Court of Appeals specifically approved of this sentence. Whittle, 145 
10 Again, the abuse of discretion caused by the District Court's failure to consider this 
information is revealed. 
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Idaho at 52). Thus, the severity of punishment was predictably certain, as was the 
likelihood that a prison sentence would not be a result. 11 
However, with Ms. Skogen's sentence in the corpus juris, it is now uncertain 
whether a prison term will be imposed or whether the sentence will be suspended in 
such situations, and thus it is now impossible to accurately determine the severity of the 
pending punishment. As a result, the prospective offender will not be deterred by any 
of these sentences. Furthermore, since it has already been established that more 
lenient sentences are appropriate in such situations, see, e.g., Whittle, 145 Idaho at 52, 
Ms. Skogen's sentence should conform to these other sentences if the goal of general 
deterrence is to be served because doing otherwise destroys the certainties necessary 
for general deterrence to be effective. 
Therefore, in addition to undermining the objective of protecting society, this 
sentence also undermines general deterrence. It was not designed to provide 
rehabilitation or specific deterrence. That means the only rationale remaining for a 
prison sentence is retribution. The court actually expressed its desire to severely 
punish Ms. Skogen, implying that it was the driving concern in its sentence. (See 
3/11 /11 Tr., p.261, L.19 - p.262, L.3 (after informing Ms. Skogen that the other 
sentencing objectives really are not a concern for it in her case, it says "[t]hat really 
comes down to another factor, which is punishment," and it expounds on the fact that 
her actions resulted in the death of child).) Ergo, it is a vengeful sentence, and is thus 
11 The objective of general deterrence is adequately served by a suspended sentence 
or period of retained jurisdiction. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 
2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing 
objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives), 
rev. dismissed. 
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excessive and was imposed in an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Brown, 131 Idaho 
at 72 (citing Register, 106 Idaho at 302). 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Thirteen Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Skogen Following Her Plea Of Guilty 
To Voluntary Manslaughter 
A. Introduction 
In addition to the failure of the district court to sufficiently consider the sentencing 
objectives, as discussed at length in Section I, it also failed to sufficiently consider 
several mitigating circumstances. This failure reveals a further abuse of discretion and 
need for a more lenient sentence in tl"lis case. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; 
Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
B. Ms. Skogen's Initial Reaction And Untruthfulness Is Not An Aggravating Factor 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not 
only suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's psychological 
condition (particularly mental health issues) as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 
Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Specifically at issue here is the psychological condition which 
led to Ms. Skogen's initial untruthful account of the events that night. The district 
court determined that this was an aggregating factor. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.260, Ls.1-20.) 
However, a sufficient consideration, particularly to determine whether it is actually 
aggravating, requires a sufficient consideration as to the reason for the reaction. Such 
a consideration reveals that Ms. Skogen's reaction to this terrible situation was natural 
and normal, and so should not have been considered to be aggravating. 
21 
Dr. Hayes provided the court with a very complete description of the rationales 
behind Ms. Skogen's initial deception. (See generally 3/11/11 Tr., pp.189-225; Hayes 
Report.) In addition to diagnosing Ms. Skogen with past and present General Anxiety 
Disorder (which he says likely contributed to her actions that night) (see Hayes Report, 
p.5), Dr. Hayes described the natural, emotional response that Ms. Skogen likely 
experienced, and which was the underlying reason for inability to speak truthfully during 
the first twenty-two or so hours following the incident. 
The first aspect of this description was Ms. Skogen's personality. She had an 
impression of who she was, which was a "fixer." (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.197, Ls.16-21.) 
This presented in a passive-dependant personality and a focus on "accommodating the 
needs, wants, desires, demands, and limitations set by others." (Hayes Report, p.5.) 
Essentially, she perceived herself as a care giver. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.198, Ls.18-22.) 
Dr. Hayes described her outlook as "I am here on earth to take care of other people and 
what they want and their needs, and I will follow them if they in turn give me emotional 
support and direction." (3/11/11 Tr., p.198, Ls. 19-22.) Exemplifying this character was 
Ms. Skogen's decision to pursue nursing in her undergraduate studies. (See PSI, p.6.) 
However, despite this approach to her life, in a moment of overwhelming anger, 
Ms. Skogen acted in direct contradiction to her character. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.200, 
Ls.1-21.) She, therefore, had to resolve her actions with her character before she would 
be able to explain the event. And because her actions were so far out of character, 
such a reconciliation of the actions with her character would be "very difficult." (3/11/11 
Tr., p.201, Ls.2-6.) Normally, this reconciliation would have begun with the person 
experiencing a series of emotions, such as shock and disbelief. (See 3/11/11 
Tr., p.206, Ls.3-6.) After that initial reaction, they would begin to integrate the event into 
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their outlook. (3/11/11 Tr., p.207, Ls.4-5.) And when the event constitutes a good 
person acting so poorly, resulting in the death of another person, this integration 
process is complex, and can potentially take years to occur. (3/11/11 Tr., p.207, 
Ls.5-14 (Dr. Hayes described a situation where it took the person some thirty years to 
achieve this integration, even though there was not the additional pressure of a criminal 
prosecution or a lost job due to the event).) 
This process is usually accompanied by a period of non-disclosure. (3/11/11 
Tr., p.208, Ls. 10-11.) The reason for this is that the person has not yet come to terms 
with the event and so is unable to articulate what happened and why. (See 3/11/11 
Tr., p.208, Ls.10-13.) For Ms. Skogen, this period lasted some twenty-two hours, 
starting with the events on October 4, 2010, and ending during the interview with Officer 
Beck the next day. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.208, Ls.13-15.) And once the period of 
non-disclosure ends with the integration of the event, the person enters a period of 
revelation, which is often accompanied by experiencing grief and shame. (3/11/11 
Tr., p.208, Ls.16-17.) Ms. Skogen demonstrated this exact sequence of experiences in 
her interview with Officer Beck on October 5, 2010. (Compare 10/5/10 Tr., pp.34-53 
(the period before Ms. Skogen is able to reconcile her actions with her character, and so 
is in the period of non-disclosure) with pp.53-80 (the period after Ms. Skogen has made 
that reconciliation, and so is in the period of revelation, evidenced particularly by her 
statements evidencing grief and embarrassment.) In fact, Officer Beck also recognized 
that this was the natural and not uncommon reaction to events such as this: 
MATT SKOGEN: [to Ms. Skogen] Why didn't you tell me? 
AMANDA SKOGEN: I don't know. I was scared. 
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OFFICER BECK: This is pretty typical that people hold in a thing like this 
and there's a lot of fear and there's a lot of embarrassment. And I think 
especially when it comes to a child like this it's fear and embarrassment. 
(10/5/10 Tr., p.72, L.24 - p.73, L.5.) As Dr. Hayes summarized Ms. Skogen's actions, 
"[tJhe sequence of Ms. Skogen's reactions and behaviors after the incident in question 
and its painful outcome, is common and can be attributed to a desire to take the 
moment back and make it right." (Hayes Report, p.8.) 
In fact, the omission in Ms. Skogen's original story demonstrates that she was 
experiencing this exact series of reactions. The accepted explanation of the events is 
that Ms. Skogen, after a long, hectic day, was lying with C.J. on the couch, 
contemplating the stress of the family's financial situation, which was overwhelming. 
(PSI, pp.3-4.) Then, C.J. wet himself. (PSI, p.4.) As Ms. Skogen tried to change him, 
he became uncooperative. (PSI, p.4.) In a moment of utter frustration, Ms. Skogen lost 
control and struck out at C.J., shoving him in the abdomen. (PSI, p.4; 10/5/10 Tr., p.56, 
Ls.1-10.) C.J. fell backward and hit his head, falling unconscious, and Ms. Skogen tried 
to revive him by slapping his face. (10/5/10 Tr., p.63, L.10.) Then, she picked him up, 
and he was limp. (10/5/10 Tr., p.63, Ls.15-16.) She carried him to the bathroom, where 
she made a second attempt to revive him by splashing him with cold water. (PSI, p.4.) 
When that, too, failed to wake him, she called 911. (PSI, p.4.) 
Ms. Skogen's original story is similar in most respects. She was on the couch 
with C.J. when he wet himself. (PR, p.22) As she started to change him, ... he went 
limp. (PR., p.23.) She tried to revive him by slapping his face and carrying him to the 
bathroom and splashing him with cold water. (PR, p.23.) When that failed to wake him, 
she called 911. (PR, p.23.) 
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The only fact Ms. Skogen omitted was that she had pushed C.J., which had 
caused him to hit his head. What Ms. Skogen did in her initial story was not articulate 
her role in the events, which is consistent with the experiences of both Officer Beck 
and Dr. Hayes. In line with Dr. Hayes's explanations, she had not yet been able to 
reconcile her actions with her perspective of her character, and so was in the period of 
non-disclosure. Once she did make that reconciliation, however, she was open and 
honest with investigators. (See generally 10/5/10 Tr., pp.53-80.) Furthermore, her story 
has not materially changed since she made that reconciliation and entered the period of 
revelation. (Compare 10/5/10 Tr., p.68, L.11 - p.69, L.13 with PSI, p.4.) 
Therefore, a sufficient consideration of Ms. Skogen's psychological condition 
reveals an understanding of why she acted as she did and that it was a normal reaction 
to such a traumatic event. Furthermore, despite the difficulty of the task, she was able 
to overcome the emotions within a relatively short period of time and make a full 
disclosure of her culpability in these events. Compare with State v. Ojeda, 119 Idaho 
862, 863-64 (Ct. App. 1991) (wherein a child's step father's initial explanation absolved 
him of culpability in the child's death, but which was contradicted by the evidence. He 
maintained this position through his trial, where he was convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter). 
The court referenced two concerns it had with the effects of her initial 
untruthfulness: first, that it had somehow caused improper or incomplete treatment in 
the initial response to the 911 call, and second, that it caused C.J.'s parents to suffer 
scrutiny for a time during the investigation. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.260, Ls.1-17.) Neither of 
these concerns is grounded in the evidence, nor do they support the concept that her 
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initial deception was aggravating or anything more than a natural and normal reaction to 
such events. 
As to the first concern about the effect on C.J.'s treatment, his doctors were 
aware that he had suffered severe cranial injuries before Ms. Skogen made her original 
statement to police. (See PR, p.20.) In fact, they knew before the ambulance arrived at 
the hospital in Coeur d'Alene. (PR, p.20.) All that was initially omitted from her 
explanation was that she caused the injury, not any of the injuries themselves. Doctors 
knew the extent of the injuries, were able to recommend treatment, and transport C.J. to 
Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane before Officer Hunt (the reporting o'fficer) 
was able to respond to the call. (PR, p.20.) Therefore, the court's implied finding that 
Ms. Skogen's brief initial lack of full disclosure had somehow delayed effective 
treatment is clearly erroneous. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.260, Ls.5-7.) 
As to the second concern about the fact that C.J.'s parents were initially 
suspected, Officer Hunt was responding to a report of possible child abuse. (PR, p.20.) 
His initial contact was with Dr. Julie Celeberti, who informed him that in addition to the 
cranial injuries, C.J. had several bruises, including a black eye, which had already 
begun to heal. (PR, p.20.) Based on that information, his initial apparent assumption 
that the abuse had been ongoing was not unreasonable. Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable that he would suspect not only Ms. Skogen (who he was informed had 
been C.J.'s long-term baby sitter), but C.J.'s parents as well. Further contradicting the 
court's concern, Officer Hunt received a statement by Ms. Skogen that night, w~1ich 
indicated she did not think C.J.'s parents would abuse their son. (PR, p.25.) And not 
long thereafter (within a day), evidence came to light that removed them both from 
suspicion. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.260, Ls.15-17.) The court's finding, therefore, that the 
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suspicion that fell on C.J.'s parents (in addition to, apparently, all those persons who 
had recently provided care to C.J.) is clearly erroneous, or at least not an aggravating 
factor justifying a prison sentence in this case (particularly in light of the other 
sentencing factors, discussed in Section ll(C)). Not only did Ms. Skogen make a 
statement on the night of the incident which tended to disprove the suspicions against 
C.J.'s parents, but she made a full disclosure which absolved them of suspicion entirely 
within some twenty-two hours. 
As the evidence shows Ms. Skogen's actions were natural, given the 
circumstances and that neither of the court's alleged concerns are supported by the 
evidence, the finding that this was an aggravating factor constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
C. The Court Failed To Sufficiently Consider The Sentencing Objectives, The 
Statutory Factors, And Other Mitigating Factors As It Imposed Ms. Skogen's 
Sentence 
In addition to its insufficient consideration of Ms. Skogen's psychological 
condition, the Court also insufficiently considered several other precepts of sentencing, 
as well as other mitigating factors. In so doing, it imposed an excessive sentence in an 
abuse of its discretion. 
First and foremost, the Legislature has instructed the courts that incarceration 
should be the exception and not the rule when it comes to imposing sentences. 
I.C. § 19-2521 (1 ). A court should deal with a conviction "without imposing sentence of 
imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and 
the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that 
imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public." I.C. § 19-2521 (1) (emphasis 
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added). As the court found that Ms. Skogen did not pose a risk to society, (3/11/11 
Tr., p.261, Ls.3-7), the threshold requirement for incarceration is not even met. This 
alone demonstrates that a prison sentence was excessive and an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, as to the statutory factors which indicate society needs protection, 
five of the six are not present in this case. See I.C. § 19-2521 (1). Ms. Skogen does 
not pose an undue risk to commit another crime. (See 3/11 /11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-15.) 
She is not in need of correctional treatment. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.8-12.) There is 
no need to deter her specifically by incarcerating her. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls. 11/11 
Tr., p.261, Ls.813-15.) There is no need to incarcerate her for a general deterrence 
objective, since that objective is fundamentally flawed. (See Section l(B), supra.) And 
finally, Ms. Skogen is not a repeat offender. (PSI, p.4.). 
As to I.C. § 19-2521 (1) (c), which deals with depreciating the severity of the 
offense, the packet of cases filed by defense counsel proves that this factor would be 
met with a suspended sentence or retained jurisdiction. 12 See Tiffany, CR-00-7677; 
Nakaji, CR-02-16548; and Whittle, CR-03-4515. Ms. Tiffany was convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter of her baby when she tried to quiet his incessant cries by 
twice covering his nose and mouth. Tiffany, 139 Idaho at 911. After the child passed 
out and awoke following the first deprivation of air, Ms. Tiffany proceeded to do the 
same thing a second time, this time, smothering her child to death. See id. The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and suspended 
that sentence pursuant to a seven-year period of probation. Tiffany, CR-00-7677 
(Judgment and Sentencing Disposition). 
12 Again, this demonstrates the relevance of these cases and the court's abuse of 
discretion in not considering them. 
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Ms. Nakaji was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing her child in the 
heat of passion. 13 CR-02-16548 (Amended Information). She received a unified 
sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction, which 
it ultimately suspended for a five-year period of probation. Nakaji, CR-02-16548 (Order 
Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence and Notice of Right to Appeal). 
Ms. Whittle was convicted of injury to children (amended from involuntary 
manslaughter) for abusing her child, and ultimately, leaving the child in a dangerous 
situation - alone in a bathtub - where the child drowned. See Whittle 145 Idaho at 50; 
CR-03-4515 (Information, Amended Information, and Second Amended Information). 
She was sentenced to a ten-year unified sentence, with eight years fixed, but the court 
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. CR-03-4515 (Sentencing Disposition and Notice of 
Right to Appeal). Her sentence, too, was subsequently suspended for an eight-year 
period of probation. CR-03-4515 (Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of Right 
to Appeal). In all three prior cases, the severity of a similar offense, which resulted in 
the death of a child, was not depreciated by imposing a more lenient sentence, such as 
probation or a period of retained jurisdiction. Therefore, § 19-2521 ( 1 )( c) does not 
indicate a need to incarcerate Ms. Skogen in order to protect society by not depreciating 
the seriousness of the crime. As such, none of the factors indicate incarceration is 
necessary in this case, and so imposing a prison sentence is an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
Furthermore, four of the nine factors indicating that prison is inappropriate are 
also present in this case. See I.C. § 19-2521 (2). Ms. Skogen did not contemplate that 
13 There are no more detailed facts in the packet of cases and the appellate decision is 
a simple affirmation of the sentence without discussion. 
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her actions would cause harm to C.J. (See, e.g., 3/11/11 Tr., p.258, Ls.16-19.) She 
has no prior history of delinquency. (PSI, p.4.) As the court found at sentencing, she is 
unlikely to engage in such criminal conduct again. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-7; see also 
3/11/11 Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.4 (Christopher Gay testifying that Ms. Skogen has 
been entrusted to watch his dal.lghter on two subsequent occasions, empirically 
demonstrating that this factor favors no incarceration).) And, based on her character, it 
is unlikely that she will commit another crime, particularly since she has no other 
criminal history. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.13-15; PSI, p.4.) Therefore, based on a 
sufficient analysis of all the factors set forth in § 19-2521, incarceration is not 
appropriate in this situation, and the district court's decision to impose a prison sentence 
constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
In addition, a prison sentence in this case violates the established principle that 
sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue 
detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism. 
Cook, 145 Idaho at 489 (citing State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
In this case, the district court recognized that Ms. Skogen's risk of recidivism is already 
low. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.261, Ls.3-18.) As such, this sentence operates directly 
contrary to the principle set forth in Cook and Eubank, and forces the prison system to 
continue to detain a person for whom detention is inappropriate. 
Additionally, the court insufficiently considered the fact that Ms. Skogen has a 
substantial support network in place in the community. Family constitutes an important 
part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 
Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that familial support offered to affirm the 
defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in consideration of 
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rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would 
be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration), review denied. As her only need in 
terms of rehabilitation is counseling, she should be allowed to get it in the community, 
where her family and friends can assist in that process. Her family has already 
demonstrated that they are willing and able to assist her meet her obligations, as both 
her husband and her step-father (a police officer of over thirty years) were both 
offering to ensure she made court appearances should she be released on bond. 
(See generally 12/14/10 Tr. pp.19-33.) Furthermore, as noted, some eighteen people 
came forward and testified as to their continuing support for her at her sentencing 
hearing. (See generally 3/11/11 Tr., pp.92-189, 226-235.) Of particular note in those 
statements was the willingness to trust Ms. Skogen with providing care for their children. 
Brett and Heather Pitcher testified that they trust Ms. Skogen completely, and that she 
and her husband are still their choice to care for their children in the event that they 
should no longer be able to do so. (3/11/11 Tr., p.137, Ls.4-18, p.153, Ls.10-14.) 
Christopher Gay also testified that he has allowed Ms. Skogen to watch his daughter on 
two occasions since this incident. (3/11/11 Tr., p.185, L.25-p.186, L.4.) 
Not only does this demonstrate his significant support for Ms. Skogen, but it also 
demonstrates why a more lenient sentence will help with her rehabilitation. As the court 
noted, the only rehabilitation Ms. Skogen needs is counseling. (3/11/11 Tr., p.261, 
Ls.8-12.) This will be more effective if provided in the community (as opposed to in the 
prison) because Ms. Skogen will be able to learn lessons while being subjected to 
real-world stimuli. This kinetic learning environment has already proven beneficial to 
her, with the opportunities to watch Mr. Gay's daughter. As she told the presentence 
investigator, one of the major contributing factors to her actions against C.J. was the 
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significant amount of stress in her life at the time. (PSI, pp.3-4.) And, as Dr. Hayes 
noted, "[h]er significant psychosocial stressors within the last year, coupled with her 
current legal situation, have greatly exacerbated her level of anxiety and person distress 
and their impact on her level of functioning and adjustment." (Hayes Report, p.6.) Yet, 
despite that increase in the amount of stress, she was able to care for Mr. Gay's 
daughter without incident, evidenced by the fact that she was entrusted with that 
responsibility a second time. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.186, Ls.2-4.) This demonstrates why 
community-based rehabilitation is critical - it presents Ms. Skogen with real scenarios 
that help her more constructively respond to situations than a hypothetical situation 
presented in the static confines of the prison. Therefore, a sufficient consideration of 
this factor, too, reveals that a more lenient sentence is appropriate in this case. 
Another factor insufficiently considered was Ms. Skogen's prior record. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has continually "recognized that the first offender should be 
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, 
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). This is because the person who has 
only committed their first offense does not yet have a fixed character for crime. Owen, 
73 Idaho at 402. Ergo, Ms. Skogen, who has no prior criminal record, should have 
received a more lenient sentence. 
Finally, the court failed to sufficiently consider the extensive testimony which 
revealed that Ms. Skogen has an overall good character. She is still a trustworthy care 
provider for children. (See, e.g., 3/11/11 Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.4.) She is not a 
criminal delinquent and has no other prior encounters with the law. (PSI, p.4.) She is 
considered by other members of her community to be "a model young woman." 
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(3/11/11 Tr., p.109, L.13.) According to her religious advisor, she was willing to accept 
responsibilities to help young women in her religious community and to participate in 
community service projects. (3/11 /11 Tr., p.109, Ls.18-20.) Furthermore, she did not 
shirk these responsibilities, but was considered to be a reliable member of the 
community. (3/11/11 Tr., p.109, Ls.22-23.) In addition, she was able to accept 
responsibility for her actions and express her sincere remorse for her actions. (See, 
e.g., p.237, L.22 - p.238, L.23.) These are all facts which indicate a more lenient 
sentence is appropriate in this case, and the failure to sufficiently consider them while 
imposing sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion by the court. See, e.g., Carrasco, 
114 Idaho at 355 and Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; see also Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90 
and Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient sentence, 
still addresses all the sentencing objectives - protection of society, rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and punishment. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence. 
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects (however minimal they may be 
in this case) of the imposed sentence are still present. See, e.g., Crockett, 146 Idaho at 
14-15 (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing 
objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). In 
addition to restricting her liberty at the discretion of the Department of Corrections and 
the looming sentence, Ms. Skogen is also deprived of several of her rights (such as the 
right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the court retains 
the ability to revoke the probation and execute the original sentence if Ms. Skogen does 
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not adhere to the terms of her probation. See, e.g., Whittle, 145 Idaho at 52. However, 
the court could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed. 
See id. What the probationary period provides that a prison sentence does not is the 
opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing her to apply the lessons she 
would gain in out-patient counseling in a practical setting. See id. 
This same analysis extends to a period of retained jurisdiction. The difference is 
that it imposes a period of time where Ms. Skogen would be in a Department of 
Corrections facility instead of in the community. Furthermore, the court retains the 
ability to relinquish jurisdiction and leave Ms. Skogen incarcerated for the entire fixed 
term of the sentence if he does not show progress. However, the court could do so 
knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. 
Therefore, since these factors, particularly the ones articulated in § 19-2521, all 
indicated that a more lenient sentence is appropriate, the district court's decision to 
impose a prison sentence constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Usurping Legislative Authority And 
Creating A New Provision For Harsher Sentencing For Baby Sitters 
As demonstrated, the district court failed to impose a non-excessive sentence 
and has severely abused its discretion. And in doing so, it has imposed a solely 
retributive sentence and, in the process, usurped a legislative function by creating a 
special class of punishments for babysitters. "There's certainly an aggravating factor 
here in that, Ms. Skogen, you were a baby-sitter of young [C.J.]. You were in a position 
of trust, and you abused that trust." (3/11/11 Tr., p.259, Ls. 19-22.) This is particularly 
disturbing because several other courts in that same county have found that parents 
and legal guardians are not subject to such excessive sentencing. See Tiffany, CR-00-
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7677; Nakaji, CR-02-16548; and Whittle, CR-03-4515.14 Of most relevance is the case 
against Ms. Whittle, who was the legal guardian of the child she abused and allowed to 
die. Whittle, 145 Idaho at 50; CR-03-4515 (Amended Information). She, too, was in a 
position of trust, and violated that trust. Id. Yet even she was not given a straight 
prison sentence. Whittle, 145 Idaho at 50-51; CR-03-4515 {Sentencing Disposition and 
Notice of Right to Appeal). She was ultimately placed on probation after serving a 
period of retained jurisdiction, despite her violation of her position of trust. Id. In 
Ms. Skogen's case, the court added in an entirely new section of punishment, requiring 
prison time for a care giver who is not the parent or legal guardian who causes the 
death of a child under their care. (See 3/11/11 Tr., p.259, Ls.19-22.) 
This is an abuse of its discretion. The Idaho Court of Appeals refused to intrude 
on this legislative provision, even insofar as the judicial addition was initially intended by 
the legislature. See State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 649 (Ct. App. 2006), reh'g denied, 
rev. denied. Instead, it is a long-standing principle that the courts shall not write 
into the statutes what is not there, but must instead follow their plain language. Id.; 
Harding v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n., 39 (Idaho 1934). The information 
charges Ms. Skogen with violating I.C. § 18-4006(1), which states in its entirety, 
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a 
human embryo or fetus, without malice. It is of three (3) kinds: (1) Voluntary--upon a 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion." LC.§ 18-4006(1). There is no special provision for 
babysitters, or even those entrusted to care for another's child. See id. Therefore, the 
14 Again, this demonstrates the relevance of these cases and the court's abuse of 
discretion in not considering them. 
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court's creation of such a provision usurps the legislature's power and is an abuse of its 
discretion. 
The district court has abused its discretion in numerous ways in imposing an 
excessive prison sentence upon Ms. Skogen. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
If this Court finds that the district court erred by not considering the information 
defense counsel submitted regarding the other similar cases from Kootenai County, 
Ms. Skogen requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the district court abused its discretion and 
imposed and excessive sentence, Ms. Skogen respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 11 th day of January, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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